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CHAPTER 3 
Torts 
JAMES W. SMITH 
A. COURT DECISIONS 
§3.1. Res ipsa loquitur: Shattering bottles. In the 1959 decision, 
Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co.,1 the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court, applying the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, overruled 
precedent2 and upheld a recovery by the victim of an exploding car-
bonated beverage bottle against the bottling company. The signifi-
cance of this decision did not lie in any reversal of position by the 
Court concerning its interpretation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 
The Court adhered to its position that the res ipsa doctrine "however 
denominated, merely permits the tribunal of fact, if it sees fit, to draw 
from the occurrence itself of an unusual event the conclusion that it 
would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent." 3 
The decision did reflect however a more liberal attitude by the Court 
toward the problem of the extent to which a plaintiff must negate 
negligent conduct on the part of others, as being ins~rumental in bring-
ing about the harm, in his attempt to create an· inference of negligent 
conduct on the part of the defendant. In the Evangelio case recovery 
by the plaintiff was upheld despite the fact that not only had the bottle 
left the control of the defendant at the time the explosion occurred 
but also the plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of any recent similar 
explosions by the defendant's product. Further no evidence was intro-
duced of the standard of care ordinarily exercised by the bottle manu-
facturer. 
A 1961 decision of the Supreme Judicial Court, Hadley v. Hillcrest 
Dairy Inc.,4 dispelled any notion that the Evangelio decision would 
result in a stampede of recoveries for plaintiffs injured by the sudden, 
unexplained shattering of glass containers. The plaintiff in the Hadley 
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§3.1. 1339 Mass. 177, 158 N.E.2d 342 (1959), noted in 1959 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law 
§3.5. 
2 Howard v. Lowell Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 322 Mass. 456, 78 N.E.2d 7 (1948). 
S Evangelio v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 339 Mass. 177, ISO, 158 N.E.2d 342, 345 
(1959). 
4341 Mass. 624, 171 N.E.2d 293 (1961). 
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case injured his hand when a milk bottle shattered as he was removing 
it from the refrigerator. The bottle of milk had been delivered to the 
plaintiff's home by the defendant several days prior to the incident. 
Testimony in the case indicated that from the time of delivery neither 
the plaintiff nor any member of his family had caused the bottle to 
strike another object. As in the Evangelio case, the defendant did not 
manufacture the bottle. The plaintiff's declaration contained two 
warranty counts and a third count in tort for negligence. The de-
fendant's motion for a directed verdict was allowed, and the plaintiff 
excepted to this ruling. While the Supreme Judicial Court sustained 
the plaintiff's exceptions on the warranty counts, it upheld the trial 
court's ruling for the defendant on the third count. 
The plaintiff in the Hadley case relied heavily on the Evangelio de-
cision in arguing that he had established a "res ipsa" case on the above 
facts and therefore was entitled to have the issue of the defendant's 
negligence submitted to the jury. The Court rejected this contention 
by pointing out that the bottle in the Evangelio case contained a car-
bonated beverage and that the inference of negligence created in the 
case referred principally to the possibility that the contents of the 
bottle were excessively carbonated. This position is consistent with a 
Massachusetts decision, Burnham v. Lincoln,1i distinguished by the 
Court in the Evangelio decision. It is obviously sound. 
In order to establish a "res ipsa" case, the plaintiff must show a 
greater likelihood that the injury resulted from the defendant's negli-
gence than from some other cause. This necessarily involves the weigh-
ing of the possibilities of negligence. In the Evangelio case the pos-
sibility that excessive carbonation of the defendant's beverage caused 
the shattering of the bottle tilted the scales sufficiently to warrant sub-
mission of the case to the fact finder. The absence of that fact in the 
Hadley case tilted the scales in the opposite direction. 
§3.2. Joint tort-feasors: Release. It has long been settled in this 
Commonwealth that the release of one joint tort-feasor releases all, re-
gardless of the intention of the parties, the cause of action being 
thought of as one and indivisible.1 The manner in which the mechan-
ical operation of this rule has tended to deprive unwary plaintiffs of 
adequate recoveries was vividly demonstrated in a 1961 decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, Clark v. Zimmer Manu-
facturing CO.2 The plaintiff in this case suffered a compound fracture 
of the right femur as the result of a collision of automobiles in Mas-
sachusetts. During an operation to reduce the fracture, an intramedul-
lary nail, alleged to have been manufactured by the defendant, was 
inserted within the plaintiff's femur. Several weeks later the nail broke 
causing the plaintiff to suffer permanent injury. The plaintiff brought 
an action against the other driver and, three months after the breaking 
of the nail, he released the driver in a $10,000 settlement. The plain-
1\ Burnham v. Lincoln, 225 Mass. 408, 114 N.E. 715 (1917). 
§!I.2. 1 See Matheson v. O'Kane, 211 Mass. 91, 97 N.E. 638 (1912). 
2200 F.2d 849 (1st Cir. 1961). 
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tiff then brought an action against the defendant manufacturer for 
negligence and breach of warranty. The defendant removed the action 
to the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts on 
the basis of diversity of citizenship of the parties. On the basis of the 
release given to the original tort-feasor, the driver, the court granted 
the defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
On appeal the plaintiff argued that the alleged negligence of the 
defendant had no causal relation to the original injury but created a 
new and independent cause of action (for which the original defendant 
would not be liable), and therefore the present action was not barred 
by the release or at least the question should have been submitted to 
the jury. The defendant argued that under Massachusetts law the 
release bars the action unless, as a matter of law, the original tort-feasor 
would not have been liable for the subsequent nail fracture and ac-
companying damages. The court held that the defendant's contention 
was supported by two Massachusetts decisions, Purchase v. Seely&! and 
Vatalaro v. Thomas;4 and since it would be unable to say as a matter 
of law that the original tort-feasor was in no way responsible for the 
subsequent harm caused by the fracture of the nail, the release given 
to the original tort-feasor released also the defendant. 
An original tort-feasor is liable for subsequent harm brought about 
by a negligent intervening act only if the subsequent act is a result 
which reasonably ought to have been anticipated by him. The original 
tort-feasor is not responsible as a matter of law for the subsequent 
harm if reasonable men could not differ on the question of whether 
the subsequent act is a result which ought to have been reasonably 
anticipated by him, i.e., if the result is clearly too remote. While the 
nebulous standard of foreseeability does not easily lend itself to an 
argument based upon strict logic, it is difficult to place the fortuitous 
event of the nail's breaking in the plaintiff's femur in the category of 
possible foreseeable consequences. The decisions cited by the court 
in its opinion would not compel the conclusion reached. In Purchase 
v. Seelye5 the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a release 
given to an employer, a railroad company, did not bar an action against 
the surgeon who, believing that he was operating upon a person other 
than the plaintiff, operated upon the wrong side of the plaintiff. In the 
Purchase case the Court stated: 
The railroad company could not be held liable because of the 
defendant's mistaken belief that he was operating upon some 
person other than the plaintiff, such a mistake was not an act of 
negligence which could be found to flow legitimately as a natural 
and probable consequence of the original injury, and a ruling in 
effect to the contrary could not properly have been made. 
32!H Mass.4!J4, 121 N.E. 4U (1918). 
4262 Mass. !J8!J, 160 N.E. 269 (1928). 
Ii See note !J supra. 
3
Smith: Chapter 3: Torts
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1961
§3.3 TORTS 33 
A contrary result was reached in Vatalaro v. Thomas,6 where the 
surgeon negligently performed the operation but where there was no 
mistake by the surgeon as to the identity of the plaintiff. 
While negligence on the part of a doctor in the treatment of the 
original injury may in some cases be within the realm of foreseeability, 
it is submitted that negligence in the manufacture of the instruments 
or other objects used by the doctor is an event too remote to hold the 
original tort-feasor, and thus a release given to the original tort-feasor 
should not constitute a bar to recovery against the manufacturer of 
the defective object. 
Perhaps the primary criticism of the result reached in the Clark 
case should be leveled against the artificial distinction that exists in 
Massachusetts between a release and a covenant not to sue. This 
distinction places the plaintiff, in a situation such as existed in the 
Clark case, in a difficult position. He is unable to negotiate a 
settlement with the insurance company, which is generally unwilling 
to accept a covenant not to sue, without jeopardizing a just claim 
which he may have against another party remotely connected with the 
situation. Perhaps Massachusetts should adopt the view receiving 
favor in other jurisdictions that, unless the plaintiff has received such 
full compensation that he should no longer be entitled to maintain the 
claim, the court should give effect to the intention of a plaintiff and 
one tort-feasor that their separate settlement does not bar claims against 
other joint tort-feasors.7 
§3.3. Libel: Mercantile agencies. The action of libel has tradition-
ally involved the strict liability concept.! Thus, absent a privileged 
communication, the diligence of the defendant in collecting, assessing, 
and publishing his information will not excuse him if the statement is 
defamatory. It is for this reason that there early evolved the concept 
of privileged communications. The privilege, whether absolute or 
conditional, is based upon social interests which require protection 
even at the expense of individual interests. Each case must be ex-
amined closely to determine whether the denial of a privilege will so 
undermine a social interest that the individual right of the person 
defamed must be subordinated to the greater social need. 
A type of qualified privilege generally recognized by the courts 
pertains to the publicati9n of information by a person in discharge 
of a public or private duty, whether moral or legal. Solicitation by the 
person to whom the information is published is not essential to the 
operation of the privilege. Thus a communication made voluntarily 
by a person is privileged if a special relationship exists between the 
parties and the information is disclosed for the purpose of protecting 
6 See note 4 supra. 
7 See Adolph Gottscho, Inc. v. American Marketing Corp., 18 N.J. 467, 470, 114 
A.2d 438, 440 (1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 834 (1955). 
§3.3. ! See Corrigan v. Babbs Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260, 10 A.L.R. 
662 (1920); Prosser, Law of Torts §94 (2d ed. 1955). 
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a legitimate interest of the other person.2 The question has con-
tinually arisen in recent years as to whether a qualified privilege may 
be claimed by mercantile agencies furnishing information for profit. 
In the United States a majority of the jurisdictions that have con-
sidered the problem have upheld the qualified privilege, principally 
upon the basis that these agencies perform a very useful function in an 
economy whose lifeblood is credit.s The courts take the position that 
without a privilege few would undertake to furnish the information so 
essential to a dynamic economy or, alternatively, the cost of such a 
service would be prohibitive. In England and in a minority of 
jurisdictions in the United States the privilege is not upheld in this 
situation. This position is grounded upon the theory that, in soliciting 
requests for information for their own profit, the mercantile agency 
should not be treated in a fashion similar to one who provides informa-
tion because of a legal or moral duty to so do.4 In the 1961 decision, 
Petition of Retailers Commercial Agency, Inc.,5 the question was pre-
sented to the Supreme Judicial Court for the first time. In this case a 
subscriber of the defendant requested and received a report concerning 
the plaintiff, a mortgage broker. The report contained several inac-
curate statements about the plaintiff, as the result of which the 
subscriber ceased to do business with the plaintiff. Several of these 
statements referred to facts which were easily susceptible of a precise 
check. In the trial court the plaintiff obtained a' judgment and the 
defendant appealed. In remanding the case the Supreme Judicial 
Court accepted the majority view holding that reports made by a 
mercantile agency to an interested subscriber should be conditionally 
privileged. The Court indicated, however, that the plaintiff need not 
show ill will or spite in order to destroy the privilege. The privilege 
would fall if the reports were made recklessly or without reasonable 
grounds. This latter position is consistent with a 1960 Massachusetts 
decision dealing with abuse of a privilege through excessive publica-
tion.6 The Court rejected, however, the plaintiff's contention that, 
with reference to mercantile agencies, the standard of reasonable care 
should be imposed. 
Although the view which would require that the standard of 
reasonable care be imposed upon mercantile agencies has been ad-
vocated by many legal writers,7 the judiciary has been less than 
2 For a discussion of this type of privilege see 1 Harper and James, The Law of 
Torts §5.26 (1956). 
8 Watwood v. Stone's Mercantile Agency, Inc., 90 U.S. App. D.C. 156, 194 F.2d 
160, 50 A.L.R.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 821 (1955). See also 
cases collected in Annotation, 50 A.L.R.2d 776 (1955). 
4 MacIntosh v. Dun, [1908] A.C. 590, 2 B.R.C. 205, 12 Ann. Cas. 146; Johnson v. 
Bradstreet Co., 77 Ga. 172,4 Am. St. Rep. 77 (1886); Pacific Packing Co. v. Bradstreet 
Co.,25 Idaho 696, 159 Pac. 1007 (1914). 
5!l42 Mass. 515, 174 N.E.2d 576 (1961). 
6 Galvin v. New York, N.H. Be H.R.R., 541 Mass. 295, 168 N.E.2d 262 (1960), 1960 
Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §5.6. 
1 See Hallen, Conditional Privilege in Defamation, 25 Ill. L. Rev. 865, 875·876 
(1951); 5 Restatement of Torts §595, Comment g. 
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enthusiastic about it.8 It has, however, much merit. While there are 
strong arguments against holding a mercantile agency strictly liable 
for inaccurate reports, the question arises as to the necessity of holding 
such a business liable only for conduct which involves some degree of 
malice. Such a question is particularly pertinent in a jurisdiction 
which, unlike Massachusetts, requires as proof of malice a showing of 
ill will, spite, or willful and wanton conduct.9 Is such a protection 
really as vital to the operation of a thriving economy as the courts 
indicate? It may be argued that a requirement of exercise of reason-
able care on the part of mercantile agencies might advance rather 
than hinder social interests. If more accuracy is demanded of agencies 
holding themselves out as collectors of information, the subscriber's 
interest, in receiving reports upon which he may invariably rely, 
would be correspondingly advanced. 
Perhaps some confusion in this area has resulted from a failure to 
differentiate the various types of credit agencies. Some agencies merely 
act as repositories of information which they make available to sub-
scribers. Verification of the voluminous information provided to 
such agencies is virtually impossible. Therefore, absent a negligent 
communication of such information, liability should not accrue. 
Where, however, the agency actively investigates individuals and 
reports such information to its subscribers, a requirement that the 
agency exercise due care in its investigation and reporting would not 
appear too onerous. 
§3.4. Deceit: Fact and opinion. In 1889 the famous English deci-
sion Derry v. Peek l established a rule that in order for a plaintiff to 
sustain an action for deceit there must be proof of fraud and nothing 
short of that will suffice.2 A year earlier the Supreme Judicial Court 
in the decision Chatha1'1') Furnace Co. v. Moffatt3 held that an action 
for deceit may be maintained "by proof of a statement made, as of the 
party's own knowledge which is false, provided the thing stated is not 
merely a matter of opinion, estimate, or judgment, but is susceptible 
of knowledge; and in such case it is not necessary to make any further 
proof of an actual intent to deceive." 4 This latter position has been 
consistently upheld in Massachusetts.1S . 
Two 1960 Massachusetts decisions, Pietrazak v. McDermott6 and 
8 For an early case applying the standard of due care in an action brought against 
a mercantile agency, see Douglass v. Daisley, 114 Fed. 628, on remand, 119 Fed. 485 
(D. Mass. 1902). 
9 See, for example, Cullum v. Dun Be Bradstreet, 228 S.C. 384, 90 S.E.2d 370 (1955). 
For a comment on the Cullum case see 11 S.C.L.Q. 256,271 (1959). 
§3.4. 1 [1889] 14 A.C. 337, 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 250. 
2 According to this decision fraud is proved when it is shown that a false repre· 
sentation has been made (I) knowingly, or (2) without belief in its truth, or (3) reck· 
lessly, careless whether it be true or false. 
a 147 Mass. 403, 18 N.E. 168 (1888). 
4147 Mass. at 404, 18 N.E. at 169. 
IS See Yorke v. Taylor, 332 Mass. 368, 124 N.E.2d 912 (1955). 
6341 Mass. 107, 167 N.E.2d 166 (1960). 
6
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1961 [1961], Art. 6
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1961/iss1/6
36 1961 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETIS LAW §3.4 
Yerid v.Mason,7 highlight the inherent difficulty in many cases of 
distinguishing between a statement of fact and an expression of 
opinion. Each case involved the sale of a house to the plaintiff by the 
defendant after representations were made by the defendant concern-
ing the dryness of the cellar of the house. 
In the Pietrazak case the plaintiff, having seen a puddle of water in 
the middle of the cellar floor, asked the defendant builder whether the 
cellar would be dry. The defendant stated "that he built a good 
house and that there would be no water in the cellar." In reliance 
upon this statement the plaintiff purchased the house. Thereafter 
extensive water entered the cellar. In an action for deceit the plaintiff 
recovered for damage to personal property in the cellar and for the 
cost of corrective work. On appeal the defendant argued that the 
statements constituted mere opinion and, therefore, in the absence 
of actual fraud, the plaintiff should have been denied recovery. In 
sustaining the judgment for the plaintiff the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that the defendant's statements could reasonably have been 
understood by the plaintiff to mean that the construction of the house 
was such as to preclude the entrance of water and therefore constituted 
statements of fact as of the defendant's own knowledge rather than 
opinions. 
In the Yerid case the defendant builder, in response to the plaintiff's 
questions concerning an opening in the cellar floor around the walls, 
told the plaintiff that he was putting in a blind drain to correct ~ 
water problem. He explained that the drain would pitch toward 
a sump pump which would draw off the surface water which collected 
under the floor. This, he said, would keep the floor dry. There was 
at this time water on the floor near the pump. On a return visit by the 
plaintiff, the defendant assured the plaintiff that he would have no 
further trouble with water. Shortly after purchasing the house the 
plaintiff discovered that whenever it rained the cellar floor became 
flooded. The plaintiff brought a bill in equity for rescission. From a 
final decree ordering rescission the defendant appealed. The Supreme 
Judicial Court reversed the decree and ordered the bill dismissed on 
the basis that the statements constituted opinion or referred to matters 
promissory in nature and were therefore not actionable. In distin-
guishing the Pietrazak case, the Court stated that in that case there 
appeared to have been no pending serious water problem and that the 
builder's assertion could reasonably have been understood to mean 
that the construction of the house was such as to preclude the entrance 
of water. The Court was apparently unwilling to hold on the facts of 
the Yerid case that the defendant's assurances could reasonably have 
been understood by the plaintiff to mean that the construction of the 
drain was such as to preclude the gathering of water on the cellar 
floor. 
The Pietrazak and Yerid cases indicate that in distinguishing be-
tween statements of fact and opinion examination is not confined to 
T 541 Mass. 527,170 N.E.2d 718 (1960). 
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the language used by the defendant. The language used in the 
Pietrazak and Yerid cases is very similar. Consideration must also 
be given to the right of the plaintiff to rely on the statements. While 
reasonable reliance is generally considered as a separate element in a 
deceit action, it is necessarily germane to the question of whether a 
statement may be reasonably interpreted as fact rather than opinion. 
In the Yerid case the house in question was built in an area which 
had a serious water problem, principally because there was no drainage 
in the street. Very few houses in the immediate area had cellars. This, 
together with the presence of the drain and the sump pump, perhaps 
militated against a finding that anyone could reasonably construe 
the statements to be anything other than opinions that the drain 
and the sump pump would remedy the water situation. 
It appears that the Supreme Judicial Court in the Pietrazak case 
went very far in construing the defendant's statements as fact and was 
unwilling in the Yerid case to initiate a series of decisions which might 
gradually dilute or greatly diminish the distinction drawn in the 
Chatham Furnace Co. case between fact and opinion. 
§3.5. Imputed negligence: Owner-passenger. In a 1961 United 
States District Court decision, Miller v. United States? recovery was 
denied to the owner of an automobile for injuries and property 
damage sustained by her as a result of the combined negligence of the 
operator of the vehicle and the defendant, an employee of the United 
S'tates Government. While there was no showing of actual negligence 
on the part of the plaintiff, the wife of the operator of the automobile, 
the court, applying Massachusetts law under the Federal Tort Claims 
Act,2 held that since the plaintiff was the owner of the automobile 
and had the right to control the operatorS the negligence of the 
operator was imputed to her. Contributory negligence then barred 
recovery. This decision is consistent with Massachusetts cases which 
hold that the negligence of the operator of an automobile, in which 
the owner is traveling, is chargeable to the owner if at the time of the 
collision the owner had the right to control the operator.4 Actual 
control is not necessary.5 1£ the plaintiff is to avoid the fiction of 
imputed negligence, he must come forward with evidence that he 
surrendered or abandoned control to the operator. 
While the Miller case may have been correctly decided under 
§3.5. 1196 F. Supp. 613 (D. Mass. 1961). 
2 Under the Federal Tort Claims Act the United States is liable in the same man· 
ner and to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. Since 
the accident occurred in Massachusetts, the issues of liability are to be determined 
in accordance with the laws of that state. 28 U.S.C. §§1346(b), 2674 (1958); United 
States v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 227 F,2d 385 (1st Cir. 1955), rev'd on 
another point, 352 U.S. 128, 77 Sup. Ct. 186, 1 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1956); United States v. 
Schultz, 282 F.2d 628 (1st Cir. 1960). 
S Pennsylvania has held that since a husband is the head of the family, he is pre· 
sumed to be in control of the automobile even while driving his wife's automobile 
in her presence. Rogers v. Saxton, 305 Pa. 479, 158 Atl. 166,80 A.L.R. 280 (1931). 
4 Menzigian v, La Riviere, 334 Mass, 610, 137 N.E.2d 925 (1956). 
5 Foley v. Hurley, 288 Mass. 354, 193 N.E. 2 (1934). 
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existing Massachusetts law, it is this writer's view that legislative or 
judicial changes would be warranted in this area of imputed negli-
gence. While a fictionalized type of negligence has merit in agency 
relationships, no sound reason appears for imputing the negligence 
of the operator of an automobile to its owner merely because of the 
owner's physical presence in the automobile. The negligence of the 
bailee of an automobile is not imputed to the bailor even though 
the parties are husband and wife.6 The argument that the present 
situation is distinguishable from the bailor-bailee situation because 
of the retention of the right to control in the former situation lacks 
reality. If the operator of the automobile is driving negligently 
prior to the accident, the owner is negligent in allowing the operator 
to continue to drive. This negligence is actual rather than imputed. 
Where, however, the negligence of the operator is a sudden and 
unforeseen act, of what importance is the owner's right to control? 
Consideration might be given to the position of the Restatement of 
Torts7 that a plaintiff is barred from recovery by the negligent act or 
omission of a third person if, but only if, the relation between them 
is such that the plaintiff would be liable as defendant for harm caused 
to others by such negligent conduct of a third person.8 
§3.6. Refusal to contract: Right of newspapers to reject advertising. 
Historically the law of torts has been primarily concerned with the 
concept of misfeasance. Each individual in society owes a duty to his 
fellow beings to refrain from committing acts which either are 
designed to result in harm to person or property or foreseeably may 
do so. It is less clear that one owes a legal duty to assist others in the 
protection or maintenance of their person or property. It is therefore 
not surprising that, absent some type of estoppel or special relationship 
creating a duty, difficulty is usually encountered when a plaintiff 
attempts to recover tort damages based upon a defendant's failure or 
refusal to act. Courts have refused to transform moral obligations into 
legal duties. Thus liability has been denied in such cases as an expert 
swimmer arbitrarily refusing to save a drowning person l or a doctor 
6 Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 167 N.E. 762 (1929). 
72 Restatement of Torts §485. 
8 Comment a in §485 of the Restatement of Torts states: "In order that a negli-
gent act or omission of a third person may bar a plaintiff from recovery, the rela-
tion between the plaintiff and the third person must usually be such as to make 
the plaintiff responsible at common law to others who may be harmed by the same 
or a similar act or omission of such third person." (Emphasis supplied.) 
The question arises as to the effect in this situation of a statute such as G.L., 
c. 90, §34A, dealing with compulsory motor vehicle liability insurance. While §485 
of the Restatement of Torts indicates by caveat that the American Law Institute 
expresses no opinion on the effect in this area of a statute which imposes vicarious 
liability, Comment b on the caveat appears to indicate that a statute such as G.L., 
c. 90, §34A, should not have the effect of making the driver's contributory negli-
gence a bar to the owner's recovery. The result in Nash v. Lang, 268 Mass. 407, 
167 N.E. 762 (1929), is consistent with this view. 
§3.6. 1 See Osterlind v. Hill, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301, 56 A.L.R. 1123 (1928). 
t"' ,} 
, , 
" 
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without good cause refusing to answer the call of one who is dying and 
might be saved.2 This distinction between misfeasance and non-
feasance has taken on a great degree of importance in today's business 
world, particularly in the area of refusal to contract. Under modern 
law duty to contract generally exists only as to public officers, common 
carriers, innkeepers, public warehousemen, and public utilities.3 
In a 1961 Massachusetts case, Gordon, Inc. v. Worcester Telegram 
Publishing CO.,4 the question raised was whether the defendant, the 
owner and publisher of the only newspapers of general circulation 
in the Worcester area, was under a duty to accept advertising from the 
plaintiff, a real estate agent doing business in and around the Wor-
cester area. No allegation was made that the defendant's conduct 
was in furtherance of an illegal monopoly or other unlawful purpose, 
nor was any claim made that the defendant had entered into a con-
spiracy to deprive the plaintiff of his livelihood.5 The Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court, in affirming the sustaining of the defendant's 
demurrer, rejected the plaintiff's argument that a newspaper which 
enjoys a virtual monopoly in a given area becomes a quasic-public 
utility and must therefore accept advertising from all who may apply 
for it. The Court held that the publication and sale of newspapers 
is a private enterprise as distinguished from a business affected with a 
public interest, approving the distinction between the public interest 
concerning the advertising function of newspapers and the public 
interest in the newspaper as a news media. The view of the Court 
in the Gordon case is, with the exception of one case,6 in agreement 
with the decisions which have considered this matter.7 
While admittedly the defendant's conduct in the Gordon case has 
placed the plaintiff in a difficult position (newspaper advertising being 
extremely important to the operation of a real estate agency), sig-
nificant problems would be created were the result in the Gordon case 
otherwise. In today's complex society the public has been induced to 
rely upon various types of private enterprises for extremely important 
goods and services within a community. To say that the public has an 
interest in these particular businesses is to state the obvious. To say 
that this interest is of such a degree as to preclude the business from 
selecting those individuals with whom it wishes to contract on the basis 
that it is the only business in the area providing a particular service 
or commodity is another proposition. 
2 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058, 53 L.R.A. 135 (1901). 
3 For collected cases see Prosser, Law of Torts 480 (2d ed. 1955). 
41961 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1191, 177 N.E.2d 586. 
1\ A conspiracy would appear to involve misfeasance rather than mere refusal to 
act. 
6 Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P., N.S. 225, 31 Ohio Dec. N.P. 54 (1920). 
7 In re Louis Wohl, Inc., 50 F.2d 254 (E.D. Mich. 1931); Shuck v. Carroll Daily 
Herald, 215 Iowa 1276, 247 N.W. 813 (1933); Friedenberg v. Times Publishing Co., 
170 La. 3, 127 So. 345 (1930); Poughkeepsie Buying Service, Inc. v. Poughkeepsie 
Newspapers, Inc., 205 Misc. 982, 131 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Sup. Ct. 1954). 
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While freedom of contract is far from an absolute right,S the 
judiciary, mindful of its reciprocal function, the establishment of 
precedent, must exercise restraint in this area. While an occasional 
"hard" case may tempt judicial interference, it would generally appear 
more beneficial to allow the legislature to define the limitations of this 
right in connection with businesses which have become affected with a 
public interest. 
B. LEGISLATION 
§3.7. Excavation abutting on a public way: Duty to maintain a 
barrier. Chapter 766, Acts of 1960, amends Chapter 84 of the General 
Laws by providing as follows: 
SEC. 27. If, on premises abutting on a public way, an excavation 
is a hazard to travelers upon such way who are in the exercise of 
due care, the person in control of such premises shall be liable in 
tort to any such traveler who, by reason of a want of a sufficient 
railing or barrier in or upon such excavation or between such 
excavation and such way, sustains bodily injury or property 
damage. 
------,. 
The provisions of Chapter 766 are directly contra to established case 
law in Massachusetts.1 The duty owed by an owner or possessor of 
land to a trespasser in Massachusetts and many other jurisdictions is 
to avoid willful and wanton conduct.2 Most jurisdictions modify this 
position with reference to a technical trespasser (one who inadvertently 
or involuntarily comes in contact with land very close to the public 
way), and permit recovery based upon the negligence of the landowner 
in failing to take reasonable steps to protect travelers on the public 
way against excavations or artificial conditions near the public way.3 
This position, which has the endorsement of the Restatement of 
Torts,4 has not been followed in Massachusetts. 
Chapter 766 differs from the position of the Restatement in several 
S For a recent discussion on the limitations on this right see concurring opinion 
by Mr. Justice Douglas in Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 176,82 Sup. Ct. 248, 258, 
261,7 L. Ed. 2d 207, 221, 224 (1961). 
§3.7. 1 Howland v. Vincent, 51 Mass. 371, 43 Am. St. Rep. 442 (1845); McIntire v. 
Roberts, 149 Mass. 450, 22 N.E. 13 (1889); Lioni v. Marr, 320 Mass. 17, 67 N.E.2d 
766 (1946). 
2 Richardson v. Whittier, 265 Mass. 478, 164 N.E. 384 (1929); Chronopoulos v. 
Gil Wyner Co., 334 Mass. 593,137 N.E.2d 667 (1956). 
3 White v. Suncook Mills, 91 N.H. 92, 13 A.2d 729 (1940); Downes v. Silva, 57 R.I. 
343, 190 Atl. 42 (1937). 
4 Section 368 of the Restatement of Torts provides: "A possessor of land who 
creates or maintains thereon an excavation or other artificial condition so near an / 
existing highway that he realizes or should realize that it involves an unreasonaw.e . 
risk to others accidentally brought into contact therewith while traveling w~a­
sonable care upon the highway, is subject to liability for bodily harm thereby caused 
to them." 
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respects. It refers only to an "excavation," while the Restatement 
refers to an "excavation or other artificial condition." It is not clear 
why Chapter 766 limits the potential danger to excavations. Chapter 
766 permits recovery for both bodily injury and property harm, while 
the Restatement refers only to bodily harm. Finally, the Restatement 
uses the language: " ... that he [the possessor of land] realizes or 
should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk to others. . . ." 
The standard thereby imposed is due care on the part of the land-
owner. Chapter 766 uses the language: "If . . . an excavation is a 
hazards to travelers ... who by want of a sufficient railing or barrier 
... sustain[s] bodily injury ... " (Emphasis supplied.) It is arguable 
that under the above provision a landowner might be held liable even 
if he had not had a reasonable opportunity to discover and correct a 
defective railing. If the word "excavation" may be interpreted as 
including stairs leading to a cellar doorway, the possibility of such an 
occurrence does not appear too remote. It would not appear, how-
ever, that the legislature intended that Chapter 766 operate as a strict 
liability statute despite the absence of any language referring to 
reasonable care.1I Otherwise the duty owed to a technical trespasser 
would become greater than the duty owed to a business invitee. 
II This would appear to be so despite the fact that the House bill (H. US7) con-
tained the following language which was later deleted: ". . . provided such owner 
knew, or by the exercise of proper care and diligence should have known ... " 
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